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ABSTRACT
In recent years, a number of US states have adopted laws that require pregnant 
women to have an ultrasound examination, and be shown images of their foetus, 
prior to undergoing a pregnancy termination. In this paper, I examine one of the 
basic presumptions of these laws: that seeing one’s foetus changes the ways in which 
one might act in regard to it, particularly in terms of the decision to terminate the 
pregnancy or not. I argue that mandatory ultrasound laws compel women into a po-
sition of moral spectatorship and require them to recognise the foetus as a being for 
whom they are responsible, particularly through empathic responses to ultrasound 
images. The approach I propose extends the project of a bioethics of the image and 
highlights the need for a critical analysis of the political mobilization of empathy in 
discussions of abortion. 
Obstetric ultrasound is today one of the most widely used of prenatal care tech-
nologies in the world, such that almost all pregnant women who interact with medical 
care in pregnancy will encounter it in some way (especially in resource-rich contexts 
but increasingly also in resource-poor settings). This is often in the form of prenatal 
testing for conditions such as Down Syndrome, spina bifida and other morphological 
anomalies. Even in pregnancies in which prenatal testing is not undertaken, women 
may have ultrasound images taken in the course of the pregnancy to examine factors 
such as foetal location, placental function, or increasingly, to identify risks factors for 
preeclampsia, amongst other conditions.
Within this context of international routinization, ultrasound technology sits 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 CATHERINE MILLS2
at the crux of a “prenatal paradox” (Taylor 1997). Obstetric ultrasound contributes 
in fundamental ways to decisions about abortion on the basis of foetal characteris-
tics such as malformations or genitalia. It makes such decisions possible by revealing 
foetal characteristics to prospective parents. At the same time, ultrasound technology 
has long been implicated in anti-abortion politics and the legal restriction of access to 
abortion services. This takes various forms, including the use of ultrasound images 
and video on pro-life websites, or as evidence in legislative proceedings that seek to 
restrict access to abortion services, or the legal requirement that women access ultra-
sound services prior to undertaking an abortion.
In recent years, a number of states in USA have adopted laws that require a 
woman seeking an abortion to undergo ultrasounds prior to accessing abortion ser-
vices. Such ultrasounds are not required as part of the abortion procedure as such, 
but attempt to ensure that women see, or have the opportunity to see, their foetus 
prior to undertaking, or deciding to undertake, an abortion. These so-called manda-
tory ultrasound laws are often cast as a matter of information provision and consent. 
However, this is misleading. Instead, mandatory ultrasound laws seek to precipitate 
and mobilise a particular relationship between the pregnant woman and the foetus 
she carries, with the aim of influencing her decision-making and action in regards 
to that foetus. As Carol Sanger (2017, 109) puts it, mandatory ultrasound laws aim to 
“produce a confrontation” between the pregnant woman and foetus, compelling a 
woman to recognize the life she would end in abortion and aiming to deter her from 
that. In essence, the legal requirement to look is based on the idea that seeing one’s 
foetus changes how one might feel about it, and further, how one ought to act in 
regards to it. In short, the idea is that seeing the foetus has ethical effects.
While these laws have been widely criticized by legal scholars, the ethical im-
plications of this harnessing of foetal images to legal access to abortion has received 
little attention in bioethics. Moreover, of the literature on mandatory ultrasound 
laws, very little considers in detail the underlying premise of these laws, that is, that 
seeing one’s foetus changes how one might act in relation to it—an idea, I argue, that 
is based more on the feelings precipitated by the image of one’s foetus rather than any 
informational value it might have (or be purported to have).
In order to elaborate this idea, I build on the case made by Paul Lauritzen that a 
‘visual bioethics’ is required to understand the ways that foetal images such as those 
produced through obstetric ultrasound have persuasive force, and are mobilised 
within antiabortion campaigns as “visual arguments”. One difficulty with Lauretzin’s 
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approach is that it says very little about why images of the foetus might have per-
suasive force; I remedy this by turning to discussions of moral spectatorship and 
empathy. In a brief discussion in The Ethics of Care and Empathy (2007), Michael Slote 
suggests that ultrasound images may affect the empathic relation that can be main-
tained with the foetus, and consequently, their moral status. I extend Slote’s com-
ments about empathy and abortion to consider the feelings involved in seeing the 
foetus and its connection to moral decision-making. Slote’s comments, then, provide 
a starting point for a more extensive reflection on the relationship between visibility, 
emotion and ethics as enacted in obstetric ultrasound.
My discussion proceeds in three parts, the first two of which are broadly motivat-
ed by a concern with the connection between seeing and feeling. In the first section, 
I provide a brief outline of various ways that obstetric ultrasound has historically 
and contemporarily been linked to abortion politics, because of its capacity of make 
the foetus visible. One aspect of this is the notion of maternal bonding, to which 
ultrasound has been seen as contributing. In section two, I focus on the concept of 
empathy as a means of elaborating the ethical significance of the seeing-feeling nexus, 
specifically by taking up Slote’s comments on empathy and abortion to discuss three 
points. First, I discuss the question of how we ought to characterise the emotional 
relationship with the foetus that is at least in part made possible by imaging tech-
nologies such as obstetric ultrasound. Second, I discuss the way in which ultrasound 
necessarily mediates the relationship that the viewer maintains with a foetus in utero 
and consider whether this matters for an ethics of empathy, such as that proposed by 
Slote. Finally, I consider the question of how ultrasound images are interpreted, espe-
cially given the background context of medical and social norms. I suggest here that 
the social and medical framing of an ultrasound image makes a difference to the em-
pathic relationship that may come into play. In the third part of the paper, I consider 
the connection between feeling and doing, and the way that mandatory ultrasound 
laws mobilise this for political purposes. I argue in this section that such laws attempt 
to mandate a specific emotional relationship between the pregnant woman and the 
foetus she carries. Moreover, understood in its political context, it becomes clear that 
doing so comes at the expense of empathy with the pregnant woman herself, as she 
engages in the decision-making process around abortion.
Before moving to these discussions, let me be clear about the aim of this paper, 
and particularly what it is not. Most obviously, I do not aim to provide a detailed dis-
cussion of the varieties of mandatory ultrasound statutes currently in existence, nor 
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of legal challenges to them (eg. Denbow 2015; Robertson 2011; Sanger 2008; Sanger 
2017; Smith 2013). Nor do I aim to engage in long-standing debates in bioethics around 
the ethics of abortion, or at least not directly. My interest is related to these, but also 
somewhat orthogonal to discussions of the moral status of the foetus, at least insofar 
as these revolve around claims about intrinsic characteristics of the foetus (see Mills 
2014). Instead, what I am interested in is the entwinement of foetal imaging technol-
ogy and law in framing the ethics of abortion, and specifically the supposition that 
seeing the foetus ought to or does change one’s moral responses to it. In this, the 
paper aims to extend what might be called the bioethics of images,1 by offering a more 
fulsome account of the connections between seeing, feeling and doing than has oth-
erwise been proffered in bioethics.
1. OBSTETRIC ULTRASOUND, ABORTION POLI-
TICS AND MATERNAL BONDINg
According to historians Malcom Nicholson and John E. E. Fleming (2013), ob-
stetric ultrasound technology has been a major driver of the medicalization of preg-
nancy and childcare since its invention in the 1950s; today, obstetric ultrasound is 
routinized as a form of prenatal testing in many countries. In this routinization, it has 
also been at the heart of a “prenatal paradox”, in which knowledge provided by ultra-
sound may lead to abortion (such as when foetal anomalies are revealed by it), while 
at the same time ultrasound images have been extensively used in anti-abortion poli-
tics, in attempts to foster ‘pro-life’ sentiment and restrict access to abortion services 
(Taylor 1997). As such, obstetric ultrasound plays a complex and significant role in 
the technological mediation of the ethics and politics of abortion.
This linking of obstetric ultrasound to anti-abortion sentiments and politics is 
in itself not new. For instance, the obstetrician credited with driving its use in ob-
stetrics, Ian Donald, was strongly opposed to abortion and used ultrasound images 
to attempt to convince unmarried pregnant women in Scotland during the 1960s not 
to terminate their pregnancies. He also showed a real-time film of a foetus at an anti-
abortion rally in Milan in 1979, in the midst of Italian abortion reform debates, and 
was invited to an audience with Pope John Paul II—something that Donald himself 
1.  This formulation is both more focused and broader than that a ‘visual bioethics’ and allows for 
analysis of both the production and reception of images. Further, its neutrality in relation to sense 
perception may allow greater room for analysis of the affective and emotional aspects of the recep-
tion of images.
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saw as a crowning glory of his career (Nicholson 2000). In more recent years, ultra-
sound has been increasingly harnessed to the legal regulation of pregnant women 
and their access to abortion services, and features heavily in legislative and public 
debates.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, the capacity of ultrasound to make the 
foetus visible featured in debates over a proposal to reduce the gestational limit for 
abortions for non-medical reasons to 18-weeks. In a series of editorial and opinion 
pieces, leading obstetrician Stuart Campbell, who was a driving force in the routini-
zation of obstetric ultrasound for prenatal testing and the later use of 3 and 4-dimen-
sional ultrasound, made much of the emotional impact of seeing the foetus in utero. 
Campbell writes,
There is something deeply moving about the image of a baby cocooned inside the 
womb…Advanced scanning means we have a window on the secret life of foetuses. 
At 11 weeks, we can see them yawn, and even take steps. At 22 weeks, they begin to 
open their eyes. Between 20 and 24 weeks we watch as they seem to cry, smile and 
frown...When I see a foetus that can smile at me, I know absolutely that we should 
not tear it from the womb. (Campbell 2008).
Campbell’s slippage from the claim that a foetus may “seems to cry, smile or 
frown” to the idea that it can “smile at me” points to the difficult matter of interpre-
tation and whether, or to what extent, actions on the part of a foetus can be seen as 
expressions of emotions or feelings (Mills 2014). Further, though, Campbell links the 
construal of a direct relationship in which the foetus smiles at the viewer to a moral 
conclusion, one that makes abortion impermissible at this stage of gestation.
A similar harnessing of ultrasound images to moral conclusions has been ad-
vanced in the USA, where anti-abortion groups have pushed various legal measures 
to restrict access to abortion services in recent years. One of these campaigns has 
sought to introduce laws requiring women seeking an abortion to undertake an ob-
stetric ultrasound examination, not as an aspect of the procedure, but prior to it. 
Currently, some twenty-six states regulate the provision of ultrasound to pregnant 
women seeking abortions, with various statutes in place (guttmacher Institute 2018). 
The most onerous of these laws, in Texas, Louisiana, and Wisconsin, require that the 
abortion provider perform an ultrasound for each abortion sought, and both display 
the image for a woman to see, and describe it to her. Other states require that pro-
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viders give the woman the opportunity to see the images, and, in some, hear a de-
tailed description of it, before performing an abortion. Others require providers who 
already perform an ultrasound as part of the preparation for an abortion to provide 
women with an opportunity to view the image. The weakest forms of the law require 
providers to offer to perform an ultrasound.
The key justification offered for such legislation has been that ultrasound ex-
amination ensures that women are properly informed before they make an irrevers-
ible decision about their health and their pregnancy. A supposed effect of this is to 
protect their reproductive autonomy and strengthen their capacity to resist coercion. 
This reasoning is typified in the Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act, which requires 
that women be provided with an information booklet and undergo an ultrasound 
examination, including a verbal explanation of the foetus’s development and mor-
phology, at least 24 hours prior to undergoing an abortion. This bill initially appears 
to be motivated by the principles of informed choice and reproductive autonomy. For 
example, the recently revised information pamphlet that must be provided to women 
seeking an abortion opens with the statement “You need good information in order 
to make important decisions about your pregnancy and your life. You have the right 
to make these decisions freely. No one else should make them for you” (Texas DHS 
2016, 1). The pamphlet then goes on to provide information about the risks of abor-
tion, detailed information about foetal development including colour pictures, and 
information about financial and other services to assist in raising a child.2
This justification in terms of informed choice and reproductive autonomy has 
been widely criticized, including by academic commentators on the laws. For instance, 
numerous commentators have pointed out that the ultrasounds do not provide in-
formation that is medically necessary to consent to an abortion procedure. Others 
challenge the link drawn between the informational aspects of ultrasound examina-
tions and reproductive autonomy. For instance, James Rocha (2012) argues that the 
laws do not enhance autonomy but limit it by overriding a woman’s prerogative to 
determine “how she wants emotion to be inserted into the process” of deliberation 
(2012, 49). going further, Jennifer Denbow (2015) argues that such uses of ideas of au-
tonomy are actually reshaping what autonomy means culturally and politically; she 
2.  Notably, the images of the foetus included in the 2003 version of the pamphlet were taken from 
Lennart Nillson’s classic book, A Child is Born. This is interesting because Nillson’s images are not 
representations of the foetus designed for medical information provision, but highly stylised works 
of art, often involving foetal remains. For an informative discussion of Nillson’s images, see Lupton, 
D. (2013).
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writes “autonomy is being conceived in terms of risk minimization and a medicalized, 
though legally controlled, notion of informed consent”. Further, she points out that 
this conception of autonomy aligns with the notion that women are being coerced by 
medical practitioners and sexual partners to undertake abortions. The idea, then, is 
that providing additional information about the foetus will enable women to resist 
that coercion, and make their own autonomous decision in light of increased knowl-
edge about the foetus.
Useful and important as such critiques are, they still tend to give too much cre-
dence to the claim that ultrasound examination prior to gaining access to abortion 
services is in fact about information provision. In this, an opportunity to critique the 
epistemology of ultrasound and foetal imaging is missed. For instance, as Julie Palmer 
(2009) has pointed out in an extended reflection on Campbell’s commentaries on ul-
trasound and abortion that I mentioned above, the public mobilization of ultrasound 
images often entails a conflation of seeing with knowing. This, she claims, is evident in 
the idea that ultrasound allows one to ‘face the facts’ of abortion, for instance, which 
belies the necessity of interpretation in order to make sense of what one sees. In this, 
ultrasound is cast as a “moral speculum” (Mills 2014, 93), insofar as it seems to allow 
the viewer to peer inside and see/know what kind of moral being one is dealing with. 
Interestingly, this conflation also underpins Paul Lauritzen’s (2008) claim that the in-
terplay of words and pictures in the use of ultrasound images and other visual media 
in abortion debates constitute “visually mediated arguments”. He builds on this to 
claim that the characteristics of argumentation, such as consistency and factual ac-
curacy, can be used to assess the contribution that images make to debates on abor-
tion. Contrary to the supposition of this approach, it is often extremely difficult to 
say with any clarity just what argument an image might be advancing in and of itself. 
In fact, this approach returns attention to the narrative that frames an image and its 
interpretation, such that the image is merely supplemental to that narrative.
What is obscured here is the emotional or affective impact an ultrasound image 
may have. To be sure, the emotional aspect of images is often mentioned, but is 
rarely analysed in any depth. For instance, Lauritzen suggests that uses of ultrasound 
images may lead to “emotional manipulation”, while Rocha acknowledges that the 
requirement to view the ultrasound image injects emotion into the decision-making 
process (Lauritzen 2008; Rocha 2012). However, there is no articulation of what emo-
tions might be involved, or of the moral significance of this dimension of seeing an 
image. In order to bring this into focus, it is first worth stating that the informational 
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justification for mandatory ultrasound is in fact fundamentally misleading, since the 
provision of information could be achieved in ways other than requiring women to 
undergo ultrasound examinations. For this, the provision of a pamphlet (such as that 
also mandated in the Texas Woman’s Right to Know Act) providing medically ac-
curate information about foetal development and the abortion procedure should 
be sufficient.3 Further, if it is the case that ultrasound images provide some specific 
information that other images may not, such images could also be included in an 
informational pamphlet. What becomes clear at this point, is that the requirement 
that a woman seeking an abortion has an ultrasound (and views the images thereby 
produced) relies on and seeks to mobilize a crucial extra element. This is the idea that 
seeing one’s own foetus (not just any foetus) has a significant effect on how one feels 
about it, and further, how one might act in relation to it (Sanger 2008; 2015).
This notion that seeing one’s own foetus makes a difference to how one will 
act toward it aligns with the theory of maternal bonding, to which ultrasound has 
been harnessed for some time. Although the idea of maternal bonding has a longer 
history, it has been explicitly linked to ultrasound since 1983, when two obstetricians 
published a letter to the editor in the New England Journal of Medicine, claiming that 
ultrasound has the capacity to enhance maternal bonding and potentially forestall 
decisions to abort. In this letter, the authors, Fletcher and Evans (1983), discuss two 
cases in which they argue 2D ultrasound is implicated in maternal bonding in the first 
trimester, whereas traditionally, maternal bonding was understood as restricted to 
later stages of pregnancy, after quickening. The authors cite the two women as saying 
of their foetus after viewing ultrasound images “I feel that it is human. It belongs to 
me. I couldn’t have an abortion now”, and “I am going all the way with the baby. I 
believe it is human” (Fletcher and Evans 1983).
It is worth noting the contexts in which these comments are made: the first 
woman was a victim of domestic violence and her pregnancy was discovered in the 
course of x-rays to determine damage to her abdomen. The second woman was in-
volved in a trial of early steroidal intervention to suppress foetal androgens in cases 
of congenital adrenal hyperplasia, and she had to make a decision about whether to 
undertake early intervention or wait till the mid-trimester amniocentesis to deter-
mine the sex of the foetus and consider termination in the event that it was female. 
These are not the standard contexts of women considering abortion in the first tri-
3.  The information pamphlet provided by the state of Texas mentioned previously continues to 
include discredited claims linking abortion to increased risk of breast cancer.
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mester and one imagines the intensely emotional and even traumatic occasions of the 
ultrasound may well have heightened its perceived effects. Further, it is important to 
note the caution of the authors: while they do suggest that ultrasound may have an 
effect on maternal bonding in the first trimester, they also suggest this is only in the 
case of an already strongly wanted pregnancy, and maternal ambivalence toward the 
foetus may only be resolved with later ultrasounds, in the mid-trimester. Regardless 
of these caveats, though, this letter has been credited with (inadvertently) sparking 
the anti-abortion lobby’s interest in ultrasound (Taylor 2002).
The notion that ultrasound precipitates or enhances bonding seems to have 
been strengthened by 3 and 4D ultrasound, which presents a much more vivid and 
‘realistic’ image of the foetus than is obtained in grainy black and white 2D images. 
For instance, Campbell claimed in 2002 that while the clinical advantages of 4D ul-
trasound were disputable, the real gains lay in “parental behaviour and foetal behav-
iour” (Campbell 2002, 2). The latter is because 3 and 4D ultrasound makes it possible 
to observe small movements on the part of the foetus such as blinking. Of paren-
tal behaviour, Campbell argues that these images provoke significant emotional re-
sponses from parents, from which he concludes that the “natural desire of parents to 
see and know and love their baby before birth” ought to be recognized by obstetric 
ultrasound services. In 2006, he went further to suggest that augmentation of the 
bonding relationship by 4D ultrasound might be used to leverage positive parental 
behavioural changes – by implication, primarily on the part of the mother (Campbell 
2006). In this opinion piece, Campbell claims that it is now widely accepted that ul-
trasound scanning at 12 and 20 weeks are “the main factors involved in initiating this 
bonding process” (Campbell 2006, 27). He again urges obstetricians to take more note 
of this aspect of ultrasound scanning, particularly since there is evidence that this 
may have health benefits, for example, women may reduce their alcohol consump-
tion during pregnancy following scanning. This construal of the parental-foetal rela-
tionship gives enormous significance to ultrasound (and hence, medicine) insofar as 
it positions this technology as the principal instigator and fundamental mediator of 
the parents’ affective relation to the foetus or “baby”.
As Janelle S. Taylor (2008, 3) points out, while bonding theory was institutional-
ized in neonatal care in the early 1980s, the linking of bonding theory with ultrasound 
required a new supposition: that bonding can occur through spectatorship indepen-
dently of the embodied experience of gestation. Moreover, obstetric ultrasound ef-
fectively renders the pregnant woman herself as a spectator. As feminist scholars 
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have often argued, ultrasound images contribute to an understanding of the foetus 
as a being separate from the maternal body; in effect, ultrasound makes the foetus an 
other. Further, rendering the pregnant woman as a spectator obscures the privileged 
embodied relationship that she has to her foetus, placing her in a position more like 
that of other viewers of foetal images. As Iris Marion Young (2005, 61) argues, for 
instance “the pregnant woman’s experience of that image is just the same as anyone 
else’s who views it”. In the context of mandatory ultrasound, Young’s conclusion 
that this experience is the same as anyone else’s is overstated. For one, no-one else 
is required by law to view images of a foetus. Nor is anyone else required by law to 
offer up their body in order to produce the image. Nevertheless, pregnant women (are 
required to) participate in a visual experience of spectatorship, one which is under-
stood to generate a specific emotional response to the foetus.
Interestingly, the notion of spectatorship has been discussed in an ethical reg-
ister by film theorist, Lisa Cartwright (2008). She proposes the concept of moral 
spectatorship to elucidate the way that representations interpellate viewers or spec-
tators in particular ways, and, according to her, this occurs specifically through 
empathy. For Cartwright, empathy means “the reflexive experience of awareness of 
the thoughts, emotions . . . or concerns of an other or others” (Cartwright 2008, 23). 
In this, Cartwright understands empathy not as a matter of “feeling like” the other, 
but rather, of “feeling for” him or her (33-34). Further, the significance of empathy is 
that it may prompt a sense of responsibility for others. Cartwright writes “specta-
tors may also ‘feel themselves into’ those they can imagine not as themselves but as 
theirs, or rather, as their responsibility.” (Cartwright 2008, 235-6). What is important 
in this analysis, then, is the claim that an image or representation can precipitate the 
assumption of moral responsibility on the part of the spectator, specifically through 
an empathic response to the image. This claim shapes my discussion in the following 
section.
To summarize so far, we have seen that ultrasound images of foetuses have 
frequently been linked to abortion politics, and the idea that seeing the foetus will 
change maternal behaviour is not unique to mandatory ultrasound laws. In fact, a 
connection between ultrasound images and maternal bonding has been postulated 
for some time, an idea that relies upon the further supposition that spectatorship can 
itself precipitate a response of bonding. The idea of bonding here is obscure, but the 
notion of moral spectatorship may help make some of the stakes of the legal mandate 
to see one’s own foetus clearer. Specifically, we can say that mandatory ultrasound 
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laws, especially those that make viewing the ultrasound image compulsory, compel 
pregnant women seeking an abortion to take on the position of a moral spectator; in 
doing so, they are asked if not forced to take responsibility for their foetus through 
an empathic response to them. To make this plausible as a general description of the 
work of mandatory ultrasound laws, then, I need to discuss the notion of empathy for 
the foetus in more detail. To do this, I turn to some brief comments on empathy and 
abortion made by moral philosopher, Michael Slote, in his book The Ethics of Care and 
Empathy (2007).
2. EMPATHY AND ABORTION
Slote is recognized as one of the leading contemporary theorists of moral senti-
mentalism, and he has done much to refocus attention on the concept of empathy in 
moral philosophy. His general project is to give contemporary credence to the sen-
timentalist claims of David Hume and Adam Smith, through reference to the devel-
opmental psychology of C. D. Batson and Martin Hoffman. In this, he elaborates an 
ambitious agenda of providing both ethical and meta-ethical reasons for centring on 
the concept of empathy in normative philosophy. My task here is not to engage with 
or assess this project as a whole; rather, I am interested in a brief set of comments that 
Slote made about the value of the concept of empathy in clarifying the ethics of abor-
tion in his book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy (hereafter ECE). In this section of the 
paper, I reflect on Slote’s comments to amplify some aspects of his claims and draw 
out the connections between visibility, emotion and ethics that he suggests but does 
not elaborate. I focus on three issues: how the gestational age of a foetus may impact 
on empathy; the significance of the mediation of empathy by technology; and the 
way that social and medical norms frame the interpretation of an image and hence its 
capacity to generate empathy.
Slote’s project in ECE is to develop a comprehensive account of care ethics that 
makes the concept of empathy foundational to the practice and normative implica-
tions of caring. In this, he defines empathy as “having the feelings of another (invol-
untarily) aroused in ourselves, as when we see another person in pain” (Slote 2007, 
13). Empathy is thus distinguished from sympathy, which entails feeling for another, 
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but not feeling their emotions per se.4 In this, empathy is morally motivating in a way 
that Slote contends sympathy is not. He claims that empathy is crucial to altruism and 
moral motivation, such that “empathy makes a difference to how much we care about 
the fate of others in various different situations” (Slote 2007, 15). Because of this, in 
his view, feminist ethics of care needs the concept of empathy to elucidate why we 
might care for others. Beyond explaining the motivation for caring, the concept of 
empathy can also help extend care ethics into a fully-fledged moral theory—one that 
competes with, rather than merely complements, so-called justice based approaches. 
This is because empathy can provide a plausible criterion for moral evaluation, allow-
ing us to determine the morally right and wrong. As he puts it “empathy can be used 
to clarify moral issues about what is intuitively better or more acceptable and what is 
intuitively worse or less acceptable” (Slote 2007, 19).
Slote attempts to demonstrate these points through a brief and, he admits, very 
preliminary discussion of the ethics of abortion, wherein our intuitive responses to 
the foetus guide moral evaluation. Slote claims that his use of the concept of empathy 
is almost unique in approaches to abortion, and preceded only by an article by John 
T. Noonan, a Catholic appellate court judge. In an article entitled “Responding to 
Persons” (1973), Noonan rejects forms of theorizing about abortion that do not focus 
on persons, a category that he supposes the developing embryo and foetus ought to 
be included within. This inclusion requires making the foetus visible and percep-
tible, and rests on recognition of the foetus as like us in some fundamental sense. 
In short, recognition of the embryo or foetus as like us is not based on physiologi-
cal aspects of the foetus per se, but on comprehension of its experience. In this, 
empathy plays a crucial role. Noonan claims that while we have little direct access to 
the experience of being a foetus, since we don’t remember it “empathy may supply 
for memory” (Noonan 1973, 303); as such, it is this empathic identification with the 
foetus that allows it to be included in the “family of man” (Noonan 1973, 305). The 
moral consequence that Noonan draws from this is that empathic recognition of the 
personhood and correlative right to life of the developing foetus prohibits abortion.
Slote extends on Noonan’s claims to show that the concept of empathy may in 
fact yield an ethics of abortion more in line with pro-choice commitments, by identi-
4.  Slote’s definition of empathy is diametrically opposed to that proposed by Cartwright noted 
above. In literature on empathy, this definitional difference is not unusual. See especially Batson, C. 
D. (2009). Also see my earlier discussion of Peter goldie’s conception of sympathy and ultrasound, 
in Mills, C. (2011). Slote later revises his understanding of empathy into what he calls a 3rd person 
perspectival account. (Slote 2013).
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fying two complexities that Noonan ignores. These relate to first, foetal development 
and gestational age, and second, the difference between the late-term foetus and the 
neonate. I address each of these issues in turn; I also address a third issue that Slote 
does not mention, that of the ways in which an ultrasound image is perceived and 
interpreted within a given set of medical and social norms that shape our capacity for 
empathy.
2.1. EMPATHY, OTHER MINDS AND THE FOETUS
Slote emphasizes the issue of foetal development and gestational age to argue 
that the concept of empathy supports a conclusion that abortions undertaken earlier 
in a pregnancy are morally acceptable in a way that later abortions may not be. He sug-
gests that when made visible, early embryos often appear “alien”, and “look more like 
fish or salamanders or (at least) non-human, lower animals than like human beings”. 
As such, “we naturally tend to empathise more with [foetuses at] later stages than 
with the earlier” (Slote 2007, 18), and insofar as empathy is an evaluative criterion, 
this suggests that a moral distinction can be made between earlier and later abortions. 
This characterisation of a natural tendency to empathize more with foetuses later in 
gestation provokes a number of questions about the kind of beings with which it is 
possible to empathise, or, in other words, about the limits of empathy. given that 
Slote defines empathy as “feeling what the other feels” (and not simply feeling for the 
other), there is a question about what a foetus feels, if it feels anything at all, as well 
as one of how we know what a foetus feels. I will address the second issue later, but 
here, the key issue is whether a foetus feels things of the kind that it is possible to em-
pathize with. A first step in addressing this question is to consider whether a foetus 
feels anything.
In Slote’s and other approaches, empathy is thought of as a means of interaction 
with other minds, or more specifically, with the feelings and experiences of a being 
with a mind. As such, the presupposition is that the being that one empathizes with 
(the ‘target’) has a mind, though that does not necessarily entail that it be the mind 
of a person. The question, then, is whether a foetus has a mind—or, to put it in other 
words, is a human foetus (generally understood) the kind of being that is sufficiently 
sentient as to have experiences and feelings with which one could empathize? While 
there are several layers to this question, one way to address it is through consider-
ing the basic development of the foetal brain. As it is, the field of foetal neurode-
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velopment has itself become embroiled in abortion controversies through debates 
on foetal pain. Central to this is the issue of at what point the neural pathways that 
transmit sensorimotor information are sufficiently developed to give rise to experi-
ences of pain, with some researchers placing this as early as 15 weeks gestation and 
others at around 26 weeks gestation and later.5 Even given this divergence, though, 
there is a broad consensus that such apparatuses are not in place within the 1st tri-
mester of gestation – the time during which most abortions take place.
given this, it seems reasonable to suggest that the foetus (or embryo) with a ges-
tational age of less than 12 weeks does not have a mind, and is therefore not a sentient 
being with feelings and experiences. If that is the case, then it would seem that—
insofar as empathy presupposes another mind—it is not possible to empathize with 
it. In short, at least according to Slote’s definition of empathy, it is conceptually im-
possible to empathize with an embryo or early-term foetus in utero prior to the second 
trimester, since there are simply no feelings for another to feel. This is not to say that 
it would be misplaced to care about an embryo or early-term foetus in some way. For 
instance, one may have concern for its safety now with a view to the wellbeing of the 
future child it may reasonably be expected to become (in the absence of abortion or 
miscarriage). But, in this case, Slote’s understanding of empathy will not help to artic-
ulate that care. This suggests that Slote’s particular construal of empathy may limit its 
usefulness for thinking about ultrasound and empathy, and a less stringent definition 
in terms of “feeling for” may be more appropriate. Note, though, that Slote’s point 
nevertheless resonates with evidence that some women required to have ultrasound 
examinations prior to abortion actually express positive feelings about having seen 
the foetus, particularly relief that it is not more recognisably human. I return to this 
point later.
The recognisability of the foetus also relates to the question of the limits of our 
empathic imagination. We can see from the discussion above that both Noonan and 
Slote rely on the presumption that empathy is facilitated by similarity or likeness, 
such that the more something is ‘like us’, the more able to empathize we are, and the 
more dissimilar it is from us, the more empathy is vitiated. In this, though, likeness 
can be understood in different ways, for example, as a matter of morphology or as a 
matter of behaviour. While a human embryo (prior to about 10 weeks gestation) is not 
morphologically similar, it is incontrovertible that at developmental stages later than 
5.  For opposed positions on fetal pain, see for example, Derbyshire (2010) and Sekulic et al (2016). 
For a useful overview of the issue, see Derbyshire (2015). 
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this a human foetus does look like ‘us’ (by which I mean postnatal human beings), 
that is, like a very small human being. Despite these apparent similarities, a human 
foetus is significantly different from us as well: foetuses live in a different world to 
us and are in some ways, a different kind of beings. Foetuses do not breathe air, they 
do not eat or ingest food, and their basic habitat is significantly different to that of 
postnatal human beings—they live and flourish in a fluid-filled sac that would be the 
death of the rest of us. Moreover, they necessarily live inside the body of another.
Because of this, significant difficulties emerge in the interpretation of foetal be-
haviours. A foetus can seem to display behaviours expressively similar to ours—for 
example, moving away as an expression of pain, smiling as an expression of happiness 
and so on. However, it remains unclear whether movements and facial expressions 
on the part of the foetus are expressive of a conscious (emotional) response to the 
world or are simply reflex actions. In short, poking at the belly of a pregnant woman 
may produce foetal movement, but this does not necessarily signify that the foetus 
consciously experiences the poke as discomforting and moves away because of that.
A further difficulty relates to the way in which perception of morphology and in-
terpretation of behaviour interact. The question is, does the interpretation of behav-
iours as expressions of certain feelings or emotions as akin to ours, and with which 
we may empathize, follow from perception of morphological similarity in revealed 
in ultrasound images? And, does the interpretation of certain behaviours as having 
the same expressive function as ours moves us to attribute (moral) similarity to the 
foetus? In other words, are we moved to interpret behaviours like ours as express-
ing the same emotion because the morphological similarities mean we already think 
of the foetus as a person? Or does the interpretation of behaviour as expressing the 
same emotion as it does for us lead us to attribute personhood to a morphologically 
similar though also clearly different being? What is at issue here is whether empathy 
is a matter of comprehension of the other, or of projection onto the other. Also at 
issue is the extent to which the capacity for empathy with a foetus is implicated in 
the performative attribution of moral status to the foetus, or the recognition of that 
status (see Mills 2014).
As a final point in this section, the problem of other minds and the lack thereof 
for establishing an empathic relation with a foetus might be avoided altogether 
through a recent phenomenological argument that empathy is not circuited through 
minds, but is instead a form of immediate bodily intuition. The argument here is that 
the basically Cartesian premise of most debates on empathy, which casts empathy as a 
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mediation between ourselves and the mind of another, is mistaken. Instead, empathy 
should be understood as “fundamentally a pre-Cartesian experience that does not 
differentiate between the body and the mind of another” (Taipale 2015). On the face 
of it, this suggests a way that the foetus might be understood as a being that one can 
empathize with, insofar as it is capable of bodily expression. This would at least be 
suggested in regards to the foetus late in pregnancy, though prior to the development 
of the nervous system this would not be the case. Even so, one might suggest that this 
understanding still requires a mind—it is simply that the mind is no longer separated 
from the body and its expression in the manner of the Cartesian approach. Further, 
it might also be objected that, in the case of the foetus, there is no opportunity for 
immediate bodily intuition—except, perhaps, on the part of the pregnant woman—
since there is no bodily apprehension of the foetus without technological mediation. 
This leads us to the second complexity that Slote introduces.
2.2 EMPATHY, PERCEPTION AND TECHNOLOgY
Extending on the developmental difference thesis further, Slote asks whether 
there might be a similar difference between a foetus later in pregnancy and a newborn. 
Such a difference might arise, he suggests, because ultrasound and other technologi-
cal visualisations of the foetus are indirect modes of perception: they are less immedi-
ate than contact with a newborn. 
As this indicates, then, Slote gives some significance to immediate bodily appre-
hension in empathy insofar as he differentiates between the newborn and the foetus 
on the basis that the former are available to us through immediate perception whereas 
the latter are not; our perception of the foetus is necessarily technologically medi-
ated through, for instance, obstetric ultrasound. For Slote, this difference between 
direct and indirect modes of perception matters for moral status, but unfortunately, 
he offers little explanation for this.
In a subsequent discussion of the moral significance of distance, Slote goes on 
to reiterate the claim that perceptual immediacy can make a difference to moral obli-
gation. For him, this means that our obligations to those not immediately in front of 
us are relaxed or diminished. Even so, this discussion does not elaborate what per-
ceptual immediacy amounts to, and nor does Slote return to the initial claim that the 
indirect perception of the foetus via imaging technologies such as ultrasound dif-
ferentiates it morally from the newborn. In short, he fails to illuminate the role that 
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technology plays in shaping perception and therefore empathy, and in particular, 
the ethical significance of this mediation of perception. Here, then, I want to reflect 
briefly on this point that technological mediation of perception impacts on moral 
status, insofar as it shapes empathy.
Although the question of the technological mediation of perception has had 
little play in bioethics, it has been taken up in philosophy of technology. For instance, 
Don Ihde (1979) has argued that technology changes our hermeneutic relation to 
reality. Building on this, Peter-Paul Verbeek has explicitly attended to the technolog-
ical mediation of morality. Verbeek’s general project is to elucidate the ways in which 
‘things’ shape our moral lives. He argues that technologies and things give shape to 
our lives and precipitate certain moral actions; further, things often have embedded 
within them certain moral claims and they mediate our moral lives in fundamen-
tal ways. One of the technologies that Verbeek discusses is obstetric ultrasound. He 
argues that ultrasound “establishes a hermeneutic relation between the unborn and 
the people watching it” and effectively translates the materiality of the foetus into a 
particular representation. In the process, it constitutes the foetus as “an individual 
person…made present as a separate living being rather than forming a unity with its 
mother, in whose body it is growing” (Verbeek 2011, 24). Further, ultrasound exami-
nation transforms prospective parents into decision-making moral agents in regards 
to a foetus. Verbeek’s analysis is not altogether novel insofar as feminist scholars have 
often pointed to the ways in which ultrasound is implicated in the constitution of 
personhood. However, what it helps to focus attention on is the way in which ethical 
relationships are themselves fundamentally mediated by technology.
Several points can be made about this mediation here. First, and most funda-
mentally, ultrasound constitutes the foetus as an other, a necessary prerequisite for 
the possibility of empathy. In other words, in presenting the foetus as separate from 
the maternal body, ultrasound imaging renders the foetus as a being with whom it is 
possible to empathize in a way that it would not be possible if the foetus is conceived 
of as part of a woman’s body. In this, then, ultrasound makes empathy with a foetus 
possible in a fundamental way, by making it appear as an other being. In addition to 
this, though, imaging technologies such as ultrasound are the means of access for 
interpreting foetal behaviours as expressions of emotions with which we might em-
pathize. In other words, ultrasound and other foetal imagining technologies operate 
as the medium through which it becomes possible to observe and interpret foetal 
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behaviour. They are the means by which we ‘know’ a foetus and what it might be 
‘feeling’.
At this point, the double edge of the technological mediation of perception in 
Slote’s account becomes clearer. On the one hand, imaging technologies such as ul-
trasound are necessary to establish the possibility of empathic relations with a foetus, 
insofar as they represent the foetus as another being. They are also crucial to estab-
lishing empathy in that they are the primary means by which we can see behavioural 
indicators that might be interpreted as expressions of foetal emotion. On the other 
hand, though, the very fact that ultrasound has this role ensures that the empathic 
relation established with the foetus is secondary to that possible with the newborn. 
By virtue of this dependency on technology, the empathic relation with the foetus 
is inherently mediated in way that the haptic, bodily apprehension of the newborn 
is not. Thus, ultrasound both makes empathy with the foetus possible, and at the 
same time, ensures that the empathic relation thereby established is necessarily and 
fundamentally inferior to the direct relation possible with the newborn. It might be 
said that Slote’s reasoning exemplifies the logic of what Jacques Derrida (and others) 
identify as a “metaphysics of presence”, in which the unmediated encounter is taken 
as the primary reference point and the mediated encounter is derivative of and infe-
rior to that.
Even so, Slote’s distinction between immediate and mediated perception brings 
into focus questions about the ways in which images may elicit empathy, which is 
itself complicated in regards to ultrasound. The value of ultrasound lies in its capacity 
to see the foetus, but what is seen in the ultrasound image (whether a still or a moving 
one) thereby produced is not simply the thing itself. Ultrasound is not “a window to 
the womb” as is popularly supposed, but rather, a complex technology that produces 
an image as an artefact of sound waves. The ultrasound image is in a strict sense a re-
presentation of a foetus, produced through a synaesthesic ‘translation’ of sound into 
sight. Further, the image thus produced often requires interpretation to make any 
sense of it—it is often only when the sonographer or technician tells the viewer how 
to read the image that a foetus even becomes visible or recognisable in the image. 
This is perhaps less true of 3 and 4-dimensional ultrasound images, in which the ad-
dition of the plane of depth and in the latter, time, produces an image that is more 
susceptible to non-specialist interpretation. But, these images nevertheless require 
interpretation, as, in fact, all images do. Recognising the necessity of interpretation 
involved in the representational dimension of the ultrasound image brings to the fore 
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the fact that the image and its interpretation is always framed in particular ways. In 
short, the technological mediation of the visibility of the foetus frames the encounter 
with the foetus in specific ways.
2.3. EMPATHY, NORMS AND FRAMINg 
It is a virtual truism of feminist analyses of ultrasound imaging that such images 
frame the foetus and its relationship to the woman gestating it in specific ways, espe-
cially to occlude the bodily presence of the pregnant woman and present the foetus as 
a separate being (Petchesky 1987; Stabile 1998; Hartouni 1997; Franklin 1991; Lupton 
2013). This point rests on a critical understanding of what appears in an image, as well 
as what is left out. But the interpretation of images is also shaped by a broader notion 
of framing, insofar as the context of interpretation will also lend authority to some 
interpretive strategies and not others. As Judith Butler argues in regards to photog-
raphy, images have a “transitive affectivity,” which means that “[t]hey do not merely 
portray or represent—they relay affect” (Butler 2009, 68). Further, this harnessing of 
affect occurs in conjunction with the transmission or “iteration” of social norms that 
regulate the appearance of the socially recognizable. In other words, the body that 
‘appears’ in an image is necessarily understood in the context of social norms that 
render some bodies more socially acceptable than others. If this is correct, then it 
raises a question about how such framing by norms impacts on the interpretation and 
reception of ultrasound images and makes some empathic relations possible while 
closing off others.
In regards to ultrasound images more broadly, there are (at least) two intercon-
nected sets of norms that shape their reception and interpretation. The first and most 
obvious of these is medical norms. As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere, as a 
medical technology, ultrasound has been central to the formation and application of 
norms in obstetric care (Mills 2016). In particular, ultrasound technology has enabled 
the formation of norms of foetal development, thereby making possible the identi-
fication of foetal anomalies and/or abnormalities.6 This is in fact one of the central 
uses of obstetric ultrasound today. While ultrasound was initially used in obstetrics 
to track foetal growth rates and estimate gestational age, the routine screens through-
out pregnancy today are often seen primarily as a means of detecting foetal abnor-
malities. Consequently, at least in the context of the legal permissibility of termina-
6.  See Mills, C. (2015) as to why both the terms ‘anomaly’ and ‘abnormality’ are appropriate here. 
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tion of pregnancy, it also makes possible decisions about foetuses that do not develop 
in accordance with norms. In this, it contributes to what Eva Kittay (2006) identifies 
as a “desire for the normal”.
Arguably, the desire for the normal signals the point of intersection of such 
medical norms and the second set of norms that shape the interpretation and re-
ception of ultrasound images, that is, social norms. Social norms can broadly be un-
derstood as the informal or customary rules and principles that guide behaviour in 
a given social grouping. However, social norms do not simply regulate behaviour; 
rather, as accretions of power, they also operate as an inescapable lens through which 
forms of embodiment are rendered socially acceptable or not. In her account of the 
impact of social norms on embodiment, Judith Butler (1993) argues that the social 
legibility of different bodies is unavoidably shaped by the operation of regulatory 
norms. Butler was primarily concerned with questions of gender and sexuality, but 
her view of the regulatory effects of norms on the social legibility and acceptability 
of different forms of embodiment has also been extended into matters of race and 
disability. The upshot of this is that forms of embodiment that deviate from social 
conceptions of normal bodies are rendered illegitimate or unintelligible, as funda-
mentally undesirable.
In terms of the interpretation of ultrasound images, the point is that the inter-
pretation and affective response to such images is itself entangled in and shaped by 
the operation of social and medical norms. In short, the framing by norms means that 
any empathic relation with the foetus represented therein is itself shaped by norms 
both social and medical, and further, that the recognition of any particular foetus as 
an appropriate object of empathic relations is, to some extent, dependent on those 
norms. In philosophical discussions of empathy, the ways in which norms work upon 
a capacity to empathize is typically analysed under the rubric of bias. In this literature, 
it is broadly recognized that the capacity to empathize with the feelings of another 
are highly susceptible to bias. One issue in this susceptibility is the way in which 
moral approval and disapproval is subject to the modifying effects of social norms. 
But social norms also shape who one can empathize with, that is, who can recogniz-
ably be an appropriate target of empathy. With this in mind, it becomes apparent that 
empathy for the foetus is not straightforward, as the interpretation in a context of 
bias generated by social and medical norms means that the foetal image may interrupt 
empathic bonding as much as it precipitates it. We can identify two ways in which 
norms operate to interrupt and direct empathy in regards to the foetus.
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First, it is worth considering one of the structuring oppositions within discus-
sions of ultrasound, which I touched on in passing earlier. Recall that in the letter 
to the editor regarding maternal bonding, the women were quoted as saying “I feel 
that it is human” or “I believe it is human”. This designation of the foetus as human 
indicates that ultrasound has the capacity to bring the foetus into the sphere of em-
pathic targeting through enabling or producing its recognition as human. However, 
as Campbell notes, upon seeing 3D ultrasounds in the first and early second trimes-
ter, many women regard the foetus as “alien” (Campbell 2006, 243). This is echoed in 
Slote’s claim that the early foetus often strikes us as alien or animal-like, such that 
we “naturally empathize more with later stages than with the earlier” (Slote, 2007,18). 
This suggests that seeing the foetus at the wrong stage of gestation might actually in-
terrupt any bond that may have begun to emerge for the mother or parents – her baby 
is now rendered alien, and hence not an appropriate target for empathy. Interestingly, 
as I discuss further in the following section, this may mean that mandatory ultra-
sound viewing prior to the termination of a pregnancy has the opposite of the effect 
intended. As John Robertson (2011, 351) notes, rather than causing women to abandon 
plans for a termination, seeing the early foetus or embryo may in fact reassure women 
that a termination is morally acceptable.
Second, this interruption can also happen at later stages of development insofar 
as the interpretation of ultrasound images is saturated with norms that differentiate 
between the normal and the abnormal. What is interesting is how the medical norms 
of foetal development mesh with social norms that come to define pregnancies worth 
continuing. Moreover, these norms have themselves become fully integrated into the 
solicitation or, conversely, the suppression, of empathy. In effect, the diagnosis of 
anomaly can set a foetus outside the boundaries of empathy, breaking the maternal 
bond and rendering the pregnancy undesirable. As Catriona Mackenzie and Jackie 
Leach Scully (2007) argue, embodied experience may place significant limits on the 
capacity to empathically engage with the lived experience of differential embodi-
ment, and this failure may help to account for high rates of abortion following the 
diagnosis of foetal anomalies or abnormalities. In the context of social norms that 
underwrite a differential valuation of bodily forms, it requires a particular imagina-
tive effort to foresee a ‘life of value’ for the future child and person that a foetus with 
abnormalities may become.
As these points indicate, while the concept of empathy may be useful in articu-
lating the general emotive effect of ultrasound images on decisions about abortion, 
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we ought not assume that the response of one woman to an ultrasound image of the 
foetus she carries will necessarily be the same as that of another. Women seek abor-
tions for a variety of reasons. Some do not wish to become a parent at all, others 
not now, or in the circumstances in which they become pregnant. Some women may 
wish to be pregnant, and to become a parent, but not with this sexual partner. Others 
want to be pregnant now, but seek an abortion following the diagnosis of abnormali-
ty. given this, in the following section, I explore the disparities in women’s responses 
to ultrasound images in more detail.
3. EMPATHY AND MORAL ACTION 
So far, I have discussed some of the issues that arise in relation to the connection 
between seeing the foetus and feeling for it. What remains to be discussed though, 
is the connection between feeling for the foetus, and any (moral) action in regards to 
it. While I am not going to be able to explore this issue in great depth here, it is nec-
essary to address several points. First, there is an underlying theoretical claim being 
made that there is a connection between empathy and moral motivation. I discuss 
this claim here, and particularly whether the mediated nature of the empathic rela-
tion established through ultrasound has implications for the strength of this con-
nection. Second, throughout the paper I have noted claims about how ultrasound 
might change maternal behaviour, but I have not discussed any empirical studies of 
this claim. I do that here, including studies of the efficacy of mandatory ultrasound 
laws in preventing abortion. Following this, I turn to discussing the legal compulsion 
of empathy and make two points about mandatory ultrasound laws; first, I note a 
gendered misalignment in their operation, and second, highlight the way in which 
the compulsion of empathy for the foetus has come at the expense of empathy for 
pregnant women.
The recent revival of interest in the notion of empathy—both within philos-
ophy and more broadly in psychology and popular literature—means that there is 
now a well-established debate about the role that empathy plays in moral action. As I 
mentioned earlier, Slote argues that it plays a foundational role, not only motivating 
moral action but also providing criteria for moral approval or disapproval. Others, 
including other moral sentimentalists, argue that empathy does not have any signifi-
cant moral role—it neither provides a foundation nor a motivation for moral action. 
For instance, Jesse Prinz (2011) has argued that empathy does not fulfil the roles attrib-
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uted to it, and further, is in fact a moral ‘liability’. Prinz and other critics of empathy 
point out that as a moral motivation or foundation for moral approval, empathy is 
significantly misleading and fails to track moral judgements. This is because empathy 
is subject to various distorting effects, including bias and partiality.
For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to establish that empathy has a 
moral worth in general; what is important to consider is whether empathy has a moral 
motivating effect at all, and further, whether it has that effect in the context of gesta-
tion and the maternal-foetal relationship. Interestingly, the critical points made by 
opponents of empathy themselves lend strength to the idea that empathy is morally 
motivating, even if that motivation is not sufficiently wide to make empathy a good 
candidate for yielding moral action in general. For instance, critics of empathy point 
to a phenomenon that psychologists call the ‘identifiable victim effect’. Experiments 
on this effect show that knowing identifying features of the victim of misfortune 
produces a more significantly caring response, in terms of charitable donations and 
so on. Paul Bloom (2016) links this effect to empathy and goes on to argue that this 
shows that empathy is a poor moral guide. Perhaps; but it also shows that insofar as 
knowing the identity of a moral patient yields empathy, then empathy seems to have 
moral effects in relation to that identified target (even if not others).
This is significant in the context of gestation and abortion, because it might be 
argued that mandatory ultrasound laws are precisely an attempt to mobilize the iden-
tifiable victim effect through making the foetus visible – what is at issue is no longer 
a foetus in general, but this one foetus. After all, such laws do not require that women 
adopt anti-abortion beliefs and work to prevent the abortion of all foetuses, only that 
a woman responds to her own foetus, this particular being. In effect, ultrasound makes 
a foetus appear as a singular, embodied being with whom the pregnant woman as 
spectator bears an ethical relationship (Mills 2011). This raises the more specific ques-
tion, then, of whether seeing the foetus in the context of deciding on abortion actu-
ally makes a difference to the decisional outcome. In other words, do women change 
their minds about abortion after seeing the foetus?
Throughout the period of the international routinisation of obstetric ultra-
sound since the 1980s, there have been numerous empirical studies of the extent 
to which ultrasound images precipitate or strengthen parental, and especially ma-
ternal, bonding. given the methodological and other variations between these, it is 
difficult to make general statements about the results of them.7 However, it seems 
7.  For a critical discussion of recent studies in ultrasound bonding, see Roberts (2012).
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that viewing ultrasound images of it may have some measurable effect on emotional 
bonding to a foetus for prospective parents (or at least prospective mothers, since 
many such studies only recruit pregnant women). Recent studies have also investi-
gated the degree to which maternal attachment is impacted by factors such as the ges-
tational age of the foetus, and whether the ultrasound image is generated using 2-di-
mensional or 3 or 4-dimensional ultrasound, with contradictory conclusions drawn 
(Ji, Pretorius et al. 2005; Sedgmen, Mcmahon et al. 2006; Atluru, Appleton et al. 2012; 
De Jong-Pleij, Ribbert et al. 2013). Sedgmen et al (2006), reported that viewing an ul-
trasound image may reduce maternal consumption of alcohol (Sedgmen, Mcmahon 
et al. 2006), though it did not have an appreciable impact on other health behaviours. 
It should be noted that all of these studies were undertaken with women who were 
seeking to continue their pregnancies—they were ‘wanted’ pregnancies.
This array of evidence has led both proponents and opponents of mandatory ul-
trasound laws to assume that viewing an ultrasound image in the context of seeking 
an abortion for an unwanted pregnancy will impact on a woman’s decision to contin-
ue with or forgo pregnancy termination. There is, however, little evidence that seeing 
the foetus in the context of mandatory ultrasound prior to termination does have 
such straightforward effects. One qualitative study of women’s views on ultrasound 
in abortion care found that while both these views received some evidential support, 
mandatory ultrasound also had some unexpected results. In this study, Kimport et.al 
(2012) interviewed a sample of women receiving abortion care in two conservative 
states in the USA that have mandatory ultrasound statutes in place. They found that 
some women were dissuaded from having a termination, when they were already 
feeling ambivalent about that decision or undecided about their course of action. 
Conversely, as argued by pro-choice activists, some women found that viewing an 
ultrasound had a heightened emotional toll, but did not dissuade them from their 
prior decision to have a termination. Unexpectedly, women also reported that seeing 
the foetus made them feel better about having a termination, since it made the whole 
process of pregnancy termination “more real” or because it helped to concretize their 
responsibility in the process and “honor the complexity of her choice” (Kimport et 
al. 2012, e516). They conclude that in the context of an unwanted pregnancy, the effect 
of ultrasound viewing can have differential effects for women, including “improving 
their overall experience of abortion and satisfaction with their decision” (Kimport et 
al. 2012, e517).
Interestingly, the findings of this small qualitative study were reinforced in a 
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larger quantitative study, involving more than 15,000 patients at a Planned Parenthood 
clinic in Los Angeles, California. In this, gatter et.al (2014) collected data from 
women who chose to view an ultrasound image as part of their pre-abortion care, since 
the Californian statute requires that an ultrasound be offered, but does not mandate 
viewing. The conclusions of this study were that voluntary viewing of an ultrasound 
image in the context of abortion care has had little effect in terms of decision-making: 
98.4% of women who chose to see their foetus continued to termination, compared to 
99% of women who did not see their foetus beforehand. Of these, women with “low 
decisional certainty” (ie, who were confused, conflicted or did not want to abort), had 
slightly lower rates of continuing to termination after seeing the foetus (95.2%). As 
the authors conclude, viewing an ultrasound was only of significance for women who 
were already uncertain about the decision to terminate. And furthermore, this effect 
was strongly related to gestational age, such that women at 17-19 weeks gestation were 
20 times as likely to continue the pregnancy compared to women at less than 9-weeks 
gestation (gatter et al. 2014, 84).
Finally, a very recent mixed method study by Upadhyay et al. (2017) has exam-
ined the effects of ultrasound viewing in Wisconsin, a state that mandates that abor-
tion providers present and describe the ultrasound image to the pregnant woman 
seeking a termination, regardless of whether she wants to view the image. Even in 
the context where seeing the foetus was legally mandated, the authors report similar 
results to those above. They conclude from quantitative data that Wisconsin’s man-
datory ultrasound law was associated with a statistically significant but small in-
creased likelihood of women continuing a pregnancy. However, the authors suggest 
that this needs to be considered in context and that factors other than viewing the 
foetus – such as having to pay out-of-pocket for abortion services—may explain this 
increase (Upadhyay et al. 2017, 18). From qualitative data, they show that most women 
reported that seeing the foetus had no impact on their decision; for a small number 
(8), it had an impact, but for most of these (5) the impact was positive—it helped so-
lidify their decision to abort. Two women reported in interviews that seeing ultra-
sound images contributed to their decision to continue the pregnancy, both of whom 
reported significant ambivalence and uncertainty about seeking a termination. One 
reported that her boyfriend wanted her to abort, though she did not want to; the 
other reported that seeing her foetus on ultrasound at 16 weeks gestation resolved her 
uncertainty and made the decision to continue the pregnancy clear to her (Upadhyay 
et al. 2017, 17).
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 Two points from these empirical studies can be highlighted. First, it is worth 
noting that gestational age appears to play a role in the extent to which viewing 
one’s foetus generates morally significant attachment to it. Seeing the foetus at later 
gestational stages reportedly had more impact on women’s decision-making, and 
especially the decision to continue the pregnancy, than seeing the foetus at earlier 
stages of gestation, wherein the emotive responses were more mixed. This seems to 
synchronize with Slote’s developmental thesis, in which an image of a foetus carries 
more weight in terms of moral decision-making the more the foetus appears ‘like us’. 
The second point to highlight is that seeing the foetus appears to have most impact 
in a decisional context of maternal ambivalence. In other words, when a woman is 
less certain about the decision to terminate a pregnancy, seeing the foetus may have 
some impact, though for women with high decisional certainty, it has little impact, 
or, indeed, may have a positive effect of reassurance.
This context of maternal ambivalence points to an interesting feature of man-
datory ultrasound laws and the justifications offered for them. As Denbow (2015) 
discusses in detail, mandatory ultrasound laws are cast as a means of protecting the 
informed choice of women against the influence of men who would have them abort. 
This means they work with two somewhat contradictory ideas. On the one hand, 
they posit that viewing an ultrasound can help precipitate bonding in circumstances 
where it is absent or insufficiently developed. On the other hand, though, they posit 
that women are naturally bonded with their foetuses, and, further, that natural bond 
needs to be protected against the coercive intrusions of others, such as abortion pro-
viders and male sexual partners. In relation to the second of these, the suggestion is 
that the influence of men diminishes women’s capacity to provide properly informed 
consent for terminations of pregnancy, since they coerce women into abortions they 
otherwise do not want. If we take this claim at face value, however, what becomes 
apparent is that there is a gendered misalignment in mandatory ultrasound laws. For 
if it is the case that men are coercing women into having abortions against their will, 
it is not obviously pregnant women who need to be shown ultrasound images of foe-
tuses so much as their male sexual partners. This is not a recommendation, not least 
because in many circumstances, it would be unworkably impractical. However, it does 
make apparent the way in which such laws fit within the (biopolitical) regulation of 
the reproductive behaviour of women (Rodrigues 2014). Moreover, it also highlights 
the moral burden that is being placed on women: they are caught in the bind of being 
simultaneously a threat to the foetus and its potential rescuer.
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The double edge of this positioning also contributes to the final point that I wish 
to make here, which pertains to the political distribution of empathy in the context 
of mandatory ultrasound laws. In the previous section, I made the point that ultra-
sound works to constitute the foetus as other, which is a necessary prerequisite for 
empathy. Further, I argued that the directionality of empathy is shaped by social 
norms, such that the question of who can be recognized as an appropriate target 
of empathy is itself a question of social power. Arguably, one effect of the mobili-
zation of ultrasound images within the anti-abortion campaigns has been to direct 
empathy toward the foetus at the expense of empathy for the pregnant woman herself. 
In the unwanted pregnancy, two beings increasingly vie for empathic concern, and 
insofar as the pregnant woman is cast as threatening, she is seen as less deserving of 
that concern. In essence, insofar as ultrasound contributes to the formation of the 
two beings model of pregnancy, through the constitution of the foetus as other, it 
has meant that empathy has either been directed toward the foetus or the pregnant 
woman. And because women are seen as causing moral harm to another, they are no 
longer the appropriate target for empathic concern. In short, moral norms can get in 
the way of empathy.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper is guided by two aims—first, to extend the project of a bioethics of 
images through reflection on ultrasound imaging; and second, to critique the mobi-
lization of such images in efforts to reduce access to abortion, specifically in manda-
tory ultrasound laws in the USA. While there is a growing critical literature on such 
laws, there has been little philosophical engagement with them, and few attempts 
to unpack the basic presumption of such laws: that seeing one’s foetus changes the 
ways in which one might act in regards to it, including in terms of the (ethical) deci-
sion about whether to allow it to live or not. However, in my view, this presump-
tion raises significant questions, specifically about the relation between visibility, 
emotion and ethics. Throughout the paper, I argue that mandatory ultrasound laws 
compel women into a position of moral spectatorship and require them to recognise 
the foetus as a being for whom they are responsible, particularly through empathic 
responses to ultrasound images. In an effort to clarify the emotive effects of ultra-
sound images, I focus on the concept of empathy, to show that empathy with a foetus 
is complexly related to gestational age. I also point out that empathy is technologi-
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cally mediated, and shaped by the intersection of medical and social norms. In the 
final section of the paper, I consider the relationship between empathy and moral 
action, specifically through empirical studies of the extent to which seeing the foetus 
impacts upon decisions about termination of pregnancy. I also highlight two critical 
points: first, mandatory ultrasound laws suffer from a gendered misalignment insofar 
as the presumption is that men coerce women into abortions – in this case, if the aim 
is to prevent abortions, it is men who apparently require the bonding experience sup-
posedly precipitated by ultrasound images. Second, seen in political context, manda-
tory ultrasound laws attempt to foster empathy for the foetus, and they do so at the 
expense of empathy for pregnant women.
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